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VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE FOSTERING OVERENFORCEMENT
AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION OF THE FCPA
Karen E. Woody*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Peter Reilly’s article1 challenges the notion that voluntary
disclosure of potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations
to the government is always the best course of action for a company. In a
world where whistleblowers can receive a bounty for information
provided to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 selfreporting is a critical, high-pressure decision that each company must
undertake when faced with potential FCPA liability.
This Article takes a broader look at the FCPA landscape, focusing on
SEC enforcement, in parallel to the Department of Justice (DOJ) focus
that Professor Reilly undertakes in his Article. Specifically, this Article
buttresses Professor Reilly’s argument by pointing out that the SEC has
become an increasingly prosecutorial agency that uses disgorgement as a
punitive measure, and enjoys the ability to be both prosecutor and judge
in a settlement-driven landscape. In practicality, this means the scales are
tipped in the government’s favor, making the decision whether to
voluntarily disclose even murkier.
I. OVERENFORCEMENT AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION
As Professor Reilly points out in his Article, the FCPA was not an oftcharged statute until the 2000s.3 Specifically, from its enactment in 1977
until 2001, the SEC brought only nine enforcement actions under the
FCPA.4 Since those original cases, the FCPA “industry,” which includes
both regulators and defense counsel, has enjoyed a boom that, to date, has
not waned.
The rise of enforcement actions, often settled with deferred
prosecution agreements (DPAs) or non-prosecution agreements (NPAs)
as Professor Reilly points out, shows that the statute is now both
overenforced and overcriminalized.5
* Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School of
Business.
1. Peter R. Reilly, Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Bribery
Worldwide: Federal Transparency and Voluntary Disclosure Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1683 (2015).
2. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Whistleblower Program Surpasses
$100 Million in Awards (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-173.html.
3. Reilly, supra note 1, at 1692.
4. See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last updated Oct. 5, 2016).
5. See Karen E. Woody, No Smoke and No Fire: The Rise of Internal Controls Absent
Anti-Bribery Violations in FCPA Enforcement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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Overenforcement occurs when a violator of a legal rule suffers
excessive harm due to the actual implementation of the rule.6 Excessive
harm in the case of overenforcement is harm that is greater than what is
required for optimal deterrence.7 Likewise, overcriminalization is
broadly defined as “the overuse and misuse of the [ ] law to punish
conduct traditionally deemed morally blameless.”8 Overcriminalization
results in enforcement of laws that cover “more conduct than anyone
really wishes to punish.”9 Although SEC enforcement actions are, by
definition and institutional design, civil proceedings, the concept of
overcriminalization is equally applicable with respect to civil SEC
enforcement actions as it is to criminal actions. I contend that
overcriminalization is manifested in three areas. First, the SEC as an
agency, and certainly when investigating potential FCPA violations, has
become much more of a prosecutorial institution than a remedial one.
Second, the use of disgorgement as a punitive measure rather than a
remedial one is a sign of overciminalization in the sentencing stage.
Third, there is a substantial lack of judicial precedent within the common
law regarding enforcement of the internal controls provision, rendering
the SEC (and DOJ) both prosecutor and judge during settlement
negotiations. This section will explore these three manifestations of
overcriminalization, resulting in zealous overenforcement of the statute.
All of this factors into a company’s decision regarding voluntary
disclosure, but paints with broader strokes the landscape in which a
company has to make that decision.
A. The Evolution of the SEC’s Enforcement Division into Prosecutorial
Body
In recent history, the Enforcement Division of the SEC has swallowed
up the agency, both in resources/manpower and in setting the tone of the
agency.10 It is widely seen as the “police force” for the SEC.11 Indeed, the
SEC Chair, Mary Jo White, a former prosecutor, underscored that
prosecutorial tone when she adopted her “no broken windows” policy for

6. Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1744
(2005).
7. Id.
8. Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191,
1197, 1198 (2015) (quoting Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization:
The Proper and Improper Use of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745 (2014)).
9. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
507 (2001).
10. Cf. Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2143–44 (2015).
11. How the SEC’s Enforcement Division is Responding to Cybersecurity Challenges,
MORNINGSTAR (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.morningstar.com/news/benzinga/BenzBZW_
8588833/how-the-secs-enforcement-division-is-responding-to-cybersecurity-challenges.html.
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the agency.12 Yet, the SEC is not an arm of the Department of Justice.
This fact is lost on most corporate officers who face the same level of
investigation and threat of punishment regardless of whether it is the SEC
or DOJ that comes calling. In short, the Enforcement Division has
rendered the SEC an agency with overwhelming “police power,” at the
expense of its role focusing on guidance and remedial measures to keep
corporations in line.
Enforcement of the FCPA is no different; the drastically increasing
fines and prosecutions for violations of the FCPA since 2000 has
arguably made the FCPA one of the “hottest” areas in the Enforcement
Division.13 Since 2010, the SEC has an FCPA unit within the Division of
Enforcement.14 Contrary to the organizational structure and design of the
agency, the Enforcement Division is regulating and influencing corporate
behavior through punishment, rather than providing agency guidance
through other means.15
The hard-charging enforcement of all of the Act’s provisions is not in
line with the initial intent of the Act. In a speech given in 1981 that
manifested some of the initial and original intent of the statute, the thenChairman of the SEC Harold Williams stated the following about the
FCPA in a speech to the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants:
The Act’s eventual success or failure will, therefore, depend
primarily upon business’s response. The Commission’s
obligation, in turn, is to provide a regulatory environment in
which the private sector can address these issues
meaningfully and creatively. In this regard, we must
encourage public companies to develop innovative records
and control systems, to modify and improve them as
circumstances change, and to correct recordkeeping errors
when they occur without a chilling fear of penalty or
inference that a violation of the Act is involved.16
12. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Securities Enforcement
Forum (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539872100 (citing
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Window, THE ATLANTIC (March 1982),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/).
13. Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1289 (2015).
14. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs
and
Head
of
New
Office
of
Market
Intelligence
(Jan.
13,
2010)
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-5.htm.
15. See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The
Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (1998) (describing how the SEC
frequently makes law through enforcement cases rather than through rulemaking).
16. Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Accounting
Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Analysis (Jan. 13, 1981),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1981/011381williams.pdf.
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The notion of “encouraging” companies and “correcting errors”
without “fear of penalty” is more in line with the guiding principles of
other departments in the agency rather than the “broken windows”
policies of the Enforcement Division. For example, the Office of
Compliance, Inspection and Examinations (“OCIE”) regularly inspects
registered entities, yet does so without playing “gotcha” with the
regulated entities.17 The same can be said in the context of voluntary
disclosure; that is, when the government is hard-charging and seemingly
intent on extracting large fines and individual liability, voluntary
disclosure does not look as appealing as it may have in a more “remedial”
regime at the SEC.
B. The Problem with Disgorgement
The trend in enforcement actions by the DOJ, as described by
Professor Reilly,18 parallels the uptick in large settlement amounts
extracted by the SEC that consist entirely of disgorgement and
prejudgment interest without any finding of a violation of the anti-bribery
provisions. This type of fine is oft-termed “no-charged bribery
disgorgement.”19 These fines represent a punitive settlement rather than
an equitable one. A former associate director of the SEC’s Enforcement
Division summarized this concept by stating:
[S]ettlements invoking disgorgement but charging no
primary anti-bribery violations push the law’s boundaries, as
disgorgement is predicated on the common-sense notion that
an actual, jurisdictionally-cognizable bribe was paid to
procure the revenue identified by the SEC in its
complaint. . . . Given the bedrock principle that a court’s
equitable power to order such disgorgement only goes as far
as the scope of the violation, it is difficult to determine how
a court could lawfully allow disgorgement of profits for
uncharged violations without the remedy crossing into the
line of “punishment” for the violations actually charged.20
In order to obtain disgorgement, the government needs to prove a
causal link between the wrongdoing and the unjust enrichment. 21 In the
17. See Andrew Bowden, Dir., SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations,
People Handling Other Peoples’ Money (May 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541260300.
18. Reilly, supra note 1, at 1692.
19. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Why You Should Be Alarmed by the ADM FCPA Enforcement
Action, 9 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 58, 61 (2014).
20. Paul Berger, Do FCPA Remedies Follow FCPA Wrongs? “Disgorgement” in Internal
Controls and Books and Records Cases, 3 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP FCPA UPDATE 1, 2–4
(2011) (footnotes omitted).
21. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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case of no-charged bribery disgorgement, there typically is not any direct
link between profits and allegations of misconduct, rendering the fines
associated with no-charged bribery cases punitive in nature. The FCPA22
contains very specific guidelines and penalties for violations of both the
anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the Act.23 Fines imposed for
bribery are not part of the SEC’s § 21(d) fining authority,24 but were
included into the Exchange Act as part of the 1988 Amendments to the
FCPA.25
Disgorgement, however, is not included in the statute, nor is it even
mentioned in the original House or Senate reports of 1977, the discussion
regarding its amendments, or the 1981 U.S. General Accounting Office
Report.26 The first use of disgorgement in the settlement of an FCPA
action was in 2004, in the case of SEC v. ABB Ltd.27 Since that time, the
SEC has sought disgorgement “in virtually every FCPA enforcement
action it has brought.”28 Accordingly, the imposed fines give the
impression the company received ill-gotten gains. Yet, a cursory look at
recent SEC enforcement actions involving disgorgement makes clear the
company received no ill-gotten gains as a result of bribery.
By definition, disgorgement should not be a punitive remedy. It
should be used to separate the bad actor from any ill-gotten gains.
However, the use of disgorgement in FCPA enforcement actions seems
to serve the purposes of both deterrence and retribution: decidedly
punitive goals. This is problematic when there are no ill-gotten gains
under the meaning of the statute; that is, there has not be any contract or
business retained or obtained through the use of bribes to foreign
officials, nor has there been any illegal accounting methods to hide those
bribes. To punish a company for this conduct flies in the face of both the
purpose of the statute and the remedial options available to the
government when pursuing these allegations.
Consider this problem of disgorgement in the context of voluntary
disclosure, and in the context of Professor Reilly’s significant analysis.
Although Professor Reilly discussed recent cases in terms of DOJ fines
22. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 (2012)).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g); 78dd-3(e); 78ff (2012).
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78pp (2012)).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (2012).
26. See David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution,
and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 497 (2009).
27. No. 1:04CV1141, 2009 WL 2129216 (D. D.C. 2010). ABB disgorged $5.9 million to
settle books and records and internal controls violations. Id.
28. Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 907, 982 (2010)
(internal quotations omitted).
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as they related to the Sentencing Guidelines,29 the argument is both
analogous and valid. Voluntary disclosure of potential FCPA violations,
even where no ill gotten gains were had, nevertheless can result in
significant disgorgement remedies, and must be considered in the overall
calculus of whether to voluntarily disclose or not.
C. Arbitrariness in Enforcement and Settlements
Professor Reilly astutely notes that companies need specific and
detailed guidance and direction regarding how to stay in compliance with
the FCPA.30 In turn, companies need to create and engage a robust
compliance program in order to detect and prevent FCPA violations.
Despite a seemingly clear statutory mandate for establishing an internal
controls regime, there is a fair amount of gray area in terms of what
constitutes adequate internal controls and compliance procedures. This
concept was captured in 1983, when a federal district court stated, “[t]he
main problem with the internal accounting controls provision of the
FCPA is that there are no specific standards by which to evaluate the
sufficiency of controls; any evaluation is inevitably a highly subjective
process in which knowledgeable individuals can arrive at totally different
conclusions.”31
Few courts have ruled on FCPA internal control violations because
most defendants settle. There is accordingly little judicial precedent
surrounding compliance programs. The downside to looking merely to
DOJ and SEC settlement agreements for legal standards regarding
compliance programs is that the settlement agreements are created by
prosecutors without judicial oversight.32 In practicality, the SEC acts as
both prosecutor and judge, without much regard toward previous
settlements.
As such, SEC enforcement attorneys are able to shape the entire
landscape of the statutory enforcement.33 As the ultimate decisionmakers, they decide what actions constitute a violation of the code,
whether to investigate, whether to bring an enforcement action, and
whether and for what amount to settle the action.34 All of this occurs
without judicial review, up until acceptance of the settlement action by
29. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1700–10.
30. Id. at 1700.
31. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
32. See Peter J. Henning, Appeals Court Ruling in S.E.C. Case Will Curb Judicial Power
over Settlements, DEALBOOK (June 4, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/appealscourt-ruling-in-s-e-c-case-will-curb-judicial-power-over-settlements/?_r=0.
33. See David Hess, Combating Corruption Through Corporate Transparency: Using
Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure, 21 MINN. J. INT’L. L. 42, 62–63 (2012).
34. See generally Minzner, supra note 10 (outlining the vast discretion afforded to
enforcing agencies when making charging decisions).
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the court. The ability to cherry-pick cases and the arbitrary nature of
settlement agreements without any precedential value results in a lack of
checks and balances—and, arguably, due process—for a corporate
defendant unwilling to take its chances in court for any number of
reasons. Similarly, a corporate defendant also is less likely to “raise its
hand” and voluntarily disclose FCPA violations when the parameters for
compliance and the existence of a robust internal controls systems seem
to be moving targets.
II. THE RESULT OF OVERENFORCEMENT: OVERCOMPLIANCE AND
POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES
Overcriminalization and overenforcement of the FCPA have created
a necessary culture of compliance among many large issuers. However,
neither the DOJ nor the SEC have explicitly stated what a model
compliance program must contain to satisfy the internal controls
requirement. As such, the critical decision regarding whether to
voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations is made even trickier.
Both the DOJ and the SEC have, however, indicated when companies
have satisfied or failed to satisfy the standard through their settlement
decisions and non-prosecution agreements. However, the arbitrariness in
the enforcement of the FCPA results in a real risk of overcompliance, as
vast resources are spent on compliance systems that may be either
insufficient in the eyes of the regulators, or worse, wholly ineffective.
In fact, a growing body of evidence indicates that internal
compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within
firms and may largely serve a window-dressing function that
provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.
. . . This leads to two potential problems: (1) an underdeterrence of corporate misconduct, and (2) a proliferation
of costly—but arguably ineffective—internal compliance
structures.35
Compliance is very forward-looking in its risk-assessments and
structures. However, compliance systems are informed by the most recent
regulatory actions. As such, they are inherently reactive to regulatory
action. In this way, compliance systems may be a house of cards doomed
to fail, because those who skirt compliance measures do so in continually
novel ways. The DOJ and SEC have been reluctant to define the exact
content of an FCPA compliance program, because they want companies
to continuously improve their compliance programs when their programs
are either found to be ineffective or the industry adopts better standards.
For example, in the DOJ’s non-prosecution agreement with IAP
35. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003).
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Worldwide Services, Inc., the DOJ settled without prosecution partly
because IAP promised to take remedial compliance measures.36 These
measures included conducting periodic reviews and testing of anticorruption measures and policies in order to maintain effectiveness and
improve with recent developments.37 By requiring such measures, it is
difficult to establish a definitive program that will satisfy the internal
controls requirement—a compliance program deemed effective and
sufficient today may be found to be ineffective or outdated in the future,
particularly if a company falls behind changing standards for compliance
within its field.
Compliance, in addition to voluntary disclosure, is a corporate costbenefit exercise.
Companies may be willing to enter into such settlements—
particularly because, in the absence of a parallel DOJ action,
they need not make any factual admissions (due to the
“neither admit nor deny” nature of SEC settlements in such
circumstances), and the cost of a settlement is often lower
than continuing investigative and representative costs. But
such settlements can have severe, unintended consequences.
Perhaps most significantly, these settlements can lead other
companies to misdirect their scarce compliance resources.38
As such, compliance professionals and counsel must continually
change guidelines, but without the benefit of “hard” precedent. Instead,
they rely on the “soft” precedent of settlement agreements, as well as
increasingly stricter standards for internal controls measures, and a
playing field that is decidedly a home-court advantage for the regulators.
Of course, the question of how robust to make one’s compliance program
is directly analogous to the decision regarding whether to voluntarily
disclose. As Professor Reilly shows, that decision is not a clear-cut line,
and in many cases, voluntary disclosure is not worth the corporate costs.
The risk inherent in voluntary disclosure, therefore, increases
exponentially when compliance is not defined. Similarly, extending
corporate resources to buttress robust corporate compliance programs
may be throwing money into the wind.

36. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, IAP Worldwide Services Inc. Resolves Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigation (June 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iap-worldwideservices-inc-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation.
37. Id.
38. William J. Stuckwisch & Matthew J. Alexander, The FCPA’s Internal Controls
Provision: Is Oracle an Oracle for the Future of SEC Enforcement?, 28 CRIM. JUST. 10, 15 (2013).
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CONCLUSION
The FCPA is a complex and intriguing statute, the enforcement of
which has evolved drastically since its passage in 1977. Recent
enforcement actions have put the spotlight on the benefits and costs of
voluntary disclosure. Professor Reilly makes a significant contribution to
the literature by analyzing the real risks in voluntary disclosure, as
evidenced by a number of recent DOJ cases. In a broader sense, the real
danger lurking in FCPA enforcement is overenforcement and
overcriminalization of the statute. Just as a lack of benefit for voluntary
disclosure shows, overenforcement and overcriminalization have a
negative deterrent effective, and likely will do more harm than good in
terms fulfilling the statutory purpose of eradicating foreign bribery, and
in ensuring companies are undertaking reasonable steps to comply with
the statute and establish robust internal controls.

